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Abstract: 
Self-talk has fascinated scholars for decades but has received little systematic research attention. 
Three studies examined the conditions under which people talk to themselves as if they are 
another person, indicating a splitting or fragmentation of the self. Fragmented self-talk, defined 
by the use of the second person, You, and the imperative, was specifically expected to arise in 
contexts requiring explicit self-control. Results showed that fragmented self-talk was most 
prevalent in response to situations requiring direct behavior regulation, such as negative events 
(Study 1), experiences of autonomy (Study 2), and action as opposed to behavior preparation or 
behavior evaluation (Study 3). Therefore, people refer to themselves as You and command 
themselves as if they are another person in situations requiring conscious self-guidance. The 
implications of these findings for behavior change are discussed. 
 self | language | self-regulation | control | self-identity | personality | social Keywords:
psychology | psychology  
Article: 
Everyday life is filled with a constant stream of self-talk, which we define as inner speech that is 
self-directed and/or self-referential (Brinthaupt, Hein, & Kramer, 2009). Ninety-six percent of 
adults report engaging in an ongoing internal dialogue (Winsler, Feder, Way, & Manfra, 2006), 
and self-talk is reported in over 25% of sampled moments (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). Despite 
its ubiquity, self-talk has received little systematic research attention (see Hardy, 2006), which 
leaves basic questions about its characteristics and functions unanswered (Fields, 2002; Vicente 
& Manrique, 2011). What situations elicit self-talk? When do we talk to ourselves in the second 
person or attempt to self-command as we would do while commanding another person? These 
questions are of interest to social psychologists (Hart & Albarracín, 2009), cognitive scholars 
(Oppenheim & Dell, 2010), developmental researchers (Fernyhough & Fradley, 2005), and 
neuroscientists (Longe et al., 2010) concerned with the causes and consequences of self-directed 
language. 
Theorists have long assumed that behavior regulation is achieved in part through the use of self-
talk (e.g., Freud, 1927; Meichenbaum, 1977), yet evidence for these assertions has been elusive. 
The present research argues that fragmented self-talk, that is, self-talk in the form of second 
person statements (you can do it) and use of the imperative (act nice) should arise in situations 
requiring behavior regulation. An argument for this assumption is that, developmentally, the 
conscious control of human behavior is executed by somebody other than the actor, such as a 
caretaker or teacher. Therefore, initial commands associated with behavior control should have 
been committed to memory in the second person (Vygotsky, 1934/1987), suggesting that future 
verbal executions may proceed in a similar fashion. What was fragmented because the 
commander and the actor were physically independent may engender self-fragmentation within 
an actor using the same communicative schema to self-command. 
If fragmented self-talk occurs in situations that require self-control, several conditions may 
predict the frequency of use of the second person and the imperative. In particular, we argue that 
fragmented self-talk may ensue in response to negative events, when people feel autonomous, 
and when they are currently attempting to execute a behavior. Relative to positive events, 
negative events have been shown to correlate with increased attention, memory, mental 
simulation, and causal analysis, and by definition require heightened self-control to either resolve 
the negative event or prevent its worsening (see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 
2001; Rozin & Royzmen, 2001). Another potential trigger of fragmented self-talk may be 
circumstances in which people feel autonomous (see Ryan & Deci, 2006) and therefore must 
exercise self-control as opposed to situations in which their behavior is externally constrained. 
Finally, the need for self-control may be increased during action relative to preparation/planning 
and postbehavior evaluation. Such increases in the need for self-control may result in greater 
prevalence of fragmented self-talk manifested in the use of the second person and the imperative. 
Given that self-talk influences emotion (Wood, Perunovic, & Lee, 2009), athletic performance 
(Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Galanis, & Theodorakis, 2011), intellectual performance (Senay, 
Albarracín, & Noguchi, 2010), and self-regulation (Tullett & Inzlicht, 2010), it is critical to 
uncover factors that elicit internal speech in the first place. However, few studies have examined 
whether and when contextual factors, such as the need for control, influence the content of self-
talk. We argue that the self-system copes with situational demands for control by subdividing 
itself into two roles: a commander and a doer. Indeed, as self-regulatory skills develop, children 
learn to command themselves using self-talk much in the same way parents and caregivers used 
social speech to externally command them (see Winsler, 2009). Therefore, people should 
actively fragment the self into two entities when executive control is required, and this 
fragmentation should be reflected by imperative commands and the use of You in self-talk. 
Three studies examined the conditions under which people refer to themselves as You and 
command themselves as if they are talking to another person. This splitting of the mind was 
expected to emerge in the presence of negative events, autonomous decisions, and action. In 
Study 1, participants imagined experiencing a positive event (e.g., winning a photography 
contest) or a negative event (e.g., being insulted by a crowd of people). In Study 2, participants 
imagined being autonomous (e.g., deciding whether or not to get out of bed) or externally 
constrained (e.g., remaining silent by order of one’s parents). In Study 3, participants imagined 
situations involving action (e.g., mingling with people at a party), behavior preparation (e.g., 
considering whether or not to go to a party), or behavior evaluation (e.g., reflecting on one’s 
experience at a party).1 Events were imagined in the current research so that we could test how 
self-talk varied as a function of numerous scenarios without the need for large samples and 
multiple laboratory sessions. Additionally, we utilized third-person scenarios, where participants 
imagined the experiences of another person as if they were the actor. This decision was made to 
avoid explicitly using first-person scenarios that would necessarily prime participants with I or 
You self-references. After reading the scenarios, participants wrote down what the actors would 
say to themselves as the events occurred, based on their own experiences with similar situations. 
Participants’ self-talk was coded for self-fragmentation in terms of use of the second pronominal 
person and the imperative grammatical category. We hypothesized that negative events, personal 
control, and action would increase fragmented self-talk. 
 
Study 1: Fragmented Self-Talk Following Negative Events 
 
The purpose of Study 1 was to test whether negative events promote fragmented self-talk. 
Participants read through a series of scenarios describing situations that were either positive or 
negative and were then asked to imagine and write down what the person experiencing the event 
was privately saying to himself or herself as the event unfolded. 
 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Forty-eight psychology students (35 female) participated in the study in exchange for course 
credit. Participants completed a questionnaire titled “self-talk scenarios.” At the outset of the 
questionnaire, participants were given the following introduction: “In many situations and to 
varying degrees, people engage in a form of internal dialogue. Rather than just vague, 
unidentified thoughts, people actually respond to events or stimuli with short comments or 
sometimes even engage in full fledge conversations with themselves. This study is interested in 
the content of that inner speech or self-talk.” The following pages contained a set of hypothetical 
scenarios representing common daily life situations experienced by a few different characters. 
Participants were asked to read the scenarios carefully and—based on their own personal 
knowledge of similar situations—imagine what the character might say to himself or herself as 
the situation unfolded. Space was provided for participants to write the imagined statements as 
they emerged, just as they would have appeared in the person’s internal dialogue. Participants 
were asked to record these statements verbatim, as if they had a tape recorder inside their heads. 
Participants then read eight hypothetical scenarios, four about positive situations and four about 
negative situations (see Table 1). The eight scenarios were presented in a random order. In a pilot 
study, students rated the positivity of the scenarios on 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive) 
scales. As anticipated, positive events (α = .68, M = 6.53, SD = 0.48) were perceived as 
substantially more positive than negative events (α = .70, M = 3.06, SD = 0.72), t(31) = 21.49, p 
< .001. After reading each of these scenarios, participants were asked to imagine what was going 
through the person’s mind at the time of the event and to record this self-talk on several lines. 
Participants were told that they could use all or none of these lines depending on how much self-
talk they would generate in each situation. They were also told that informal speech (single 
words, fragments, swear words, etc.) is common during internal dialogue, and therefore 
acceptable to use in the provided spaces. 
Table 1 is omitted from this formatted document. 
Coding 
An undergraduate research assistant divided participant’s self-talk into self-statements that 
reflected a single expression (see Cloonan, 1971). Participant’s self-talk generated in response to 
the scenarios was then coded along several dimensions. First, each self-statement was coded for 
type of pronominal person. Statements that included self-references in the form of You were 
coded as second person (e.g., C’mon, you got this), whereas self-references in the form of I or 
Me were coded as first person (e.g., I need to do something impressive). Additionally, self-talk 
type was coded based upon whether statements were in the imperative (command/request), 
interrogative (question), declarative (declaration), or exclamatory (powerful emotion) form. 
Finally, the valence of each statement was coded as positive or negative. That is, statements were 
coded based on whether they conveyed expressions of positive emotions (e.g., This is awesome) 
or negative emotions (e.g., I’m so disappointed). In preparation for data analysis, we first 
counted the total number of statements generated in response to positive and negative events and 
then obtained proportions of pronominal person, type, and valence over the total number of 
thoughts for that class of events. This allowed us to ensure that any differences in self-talk could 
not simply be attributed to a greater amount of self-talk generated in response to positive or 
negative events. 
Coder Reliability 
A trained undergraduate research assistant who was unaware of the scenario content or research 
hypotheses coded each variable. An expert coder also coded 20% of the data set along the same 
categories. Interrater agreement was strong across all variables (ks > .73). For this reason, only 
the coding provided by the undergraduate research assistant was analyzed in the results that 
follow. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Self-Fragmentation 
We first examined whether a negative scenario valence produced more frequent use of the 
second person and the imperative than positive valence. As anticipated, the proportion of 
statements that explicitly referenced the self as You was significantly greater in response to 
negative scenarios (M proportion = .04, SD = 0.09) than positive scenarios (M proportion = .01, 
SD = 0.09), t(47) = 3.98, p < .001. Also consistent with predictions, the proportion of statements 
in the imperative form was significantly greater in response to negative scenarios (M proportion 
= .07, SD = 0.09) than positive scenarios (M proportion = .01, SD = 0.04), t(47) = 5.19, p < .001. 
Finally, proportions indexing the use of You and the imperative were significantly correlated in 
response to negative scenarios (r = .28, p = .05) but not positive scenarios (r = −.05, p = .72). 
This finding suggests that use of the second person and the imperative co-occur in response to 
negative events but remain independent in response to positive events. 
Valence 
Not surprisingly, self-talk that referred to positive emotions was more frequent in response to 
positive scenarios (M proportion = .97, SD = .08) than negative scenarios (M proportion = .17, 
SD = 0.19), t(47) = 27.65, p < .001. This influence of scenario type on the valence of the self-talk 
suggests a successful manipulation of event valence.2 
 
Study 2: Effects of Autonomy on Fragmented Self-Talk 
 
Our second study examined whether self-talk varies as a function of whether people are making 
internally guided, autonomous decisions or decisions that are externally constrained by others. 
We anticipated that internally guided choices and behavior would be accompanied by self-
fragmentation to a greater extent than externally guided choices. 
 
Method 
 
Participants and Procedure 
Forty-six students (27 female) participated in the study in exchange for course credit. 
Participants completed a questionnaire titled “self-talk scenarios” which had the same 
instructions and introduction as the ones in Study 1. Participants read eight randomly arranged 
scenarios and listed self-talk that might be going on in the actor’s head during the described 
experience. Half of the scenarios characterized a situation in which someone had to make a 
decision or engage in a behavior as a result of strong external demands (see Table 2). The other 
half of the scenarios comprised a situation in which someone had to make a decision or engage 
in a behavior as a result of their own internal motivation. Participants were given several lines to 
record what might be going through their minds as they imagined each of these scenarios. In a 
pilot study, students rated how autonomous the actors were on 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) 
scales. As anticipated, actors making internal choices (α = .68, M = 4.34, SD = 0.99) were 
perceived as more autonomous than actors making external choices (α = .71, M = 2.66, SD = 
0.85), t(32) = 7.89, p < .001. 
Table 2 is omitted from this formatted document. 
Coding and Organization 
Participant’s self-talk generated in response to the scenarios was coded along the same 
dimensions utilized in Study 1 by an undergraduate research assistant blind to the scenario 
content and research hypotheses. Again, based on expert coding obtained for 20% of the 
responses, the interrater agreement was strong (ks > .75). For this reason, only coding from the 
undergraduate research assistant was analyzed in the results that follow. As in Study 1, self-talk 
mean proportions were calculated for the pronominal person, type, and valence variables. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Self-Fragmentation 
The proportion of statements that explicitly referenced the self as You was significantly greater 
in response to internal choices (M proportion = .09, SD = 0.12) than external choices (M 
proportion = .05, SD = 0.07), t(45) = 2.18, p = .04. In addition, the proportion of statements in 
the imperative form was significantly greater in response to internal choices (M proportion = .18, 
SD = 0.15) than external choices (M proportion = .14, SD = 0.13), t(45) = 2.19, p = .03. Finally, 
proportions indexing the use of You and the imperative were significantly correlated in response 
to internal choices (r = .45, p = .002) but not external choices (r = .26, p = .08). This finding 
suggests that use of the second person and the imperative co-occur in response to internal 
choices but remain more independent in response to external choices. In sum, these results 
demonstrated that personal control or automony, which normally increase efforts at self-
regulation (Ryan & Deci, 2006), increased fragmented self-talk. 
Valence 
The frequency of positive self-talk did not differ across internal choices (M proportion = .28, SD 
= 0.30) and external choices (M proportion = .25, SD = 0.27), t(45) = 0.56, p = .58. This 
demonstrates that the effect of internal versus external choices on fragmented self-talk was not 
the result of differences in scenario valence.3 
 
Study 3: Fragmented Self-Talk as a Result of Action 
 
The final study examined how self-talk varies across the three critical action phases of behavior 
preparation, action, and evaluation. We predicted that fragmented self-talk would be more 
frequent during the action phase than the preparation or evaluation phases, indicative of an 
attempt to regulate or control an ongoing stream of behavior. 
 
Method 
 
Participants and Procedure 
Seventy-three students (48 female) participated in the study in exchange for course credit. The 
procedure largely followed that of the previous studies. Participants read three randomly 
arranged scenarios about a behavior sequence that included action, preparation, and evaluation 
phases (see Table 3). Participants were given several lines to record what might be going through 
their minds as they imagined each of the three scenarios. In a pilot study (n = 33), students read 
the scenarios and indicated whether they reflected preparation, action, or evaluation. Scenarios 
depicting preparation were correctly identified 76% of the time. Scenarios depicting action were 
correctly identified 73% of the time. Finally, scenarios depicting evaluation were correctly 
identified 67% of the time. Thus, the scenarios were generally perceived as reflecting 
preparation, action, or evaluation, as intended. 
Table 3 is omitted from this formatted document. 
Coding 
As in the previous studies, coding was done by an undergraduate research assistant, and an 
expert coder rated 20% of the responses. Interrater agreement was strong (ks > .71), which 
validated the use of the undergraduate’s coding in the statistical analyses. Also consistent with 
the previous studies, we calculated mean proportions for the pronominal person, type, and 
valence of self-talk. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Self-Fragmentation 
The proportion of statements that explicitly referenced the self as You significantly varied across 
the three phases, F(2, 144) = 4.01, p = .02. Second-person references were more frequent in the 
action phase (M proportion = .07, SD = 0.17) than in either the preparation phase (M proportion 
= .04, SD = 0.13), t(72) = 2.16, p = .03, or the evaluation phase (M proportion = .04, SD = 0.13), 
t(72) = 2.35, p = .02. However, the preparation and evaluation phase did not significantly differ 
in terms of second-person references, t(72) = 0.42, p = .67. 
Similarly, the use of the imperative significantly varied across conditions, F(2, 144) = 48.79, p < 
.001. As predicted, the imperative form was substantially more frequent in the action phase (M 
proportion = .10, SD = 0.11) than in the preparation (M proportion = .02, SD = 0.05), t(72) = 
7.54, p < .001, and evaluation phase (M proportion = .01, SD = 0.03), t(72) = 7.33, p < .001. 
Less importantly, the imperative was somewhat more frequent in the preparation phase than in 
the evaluation phase, t(72) = 2.45, p = .02. 
Finally, proportions indexing the use of You and the imperative were significantly correlated in 
response to action (r = .57, p < .001) but not preparation (r = .12, p = .30) or evaluation (r = .14, 
p = .23). This finding suggests that use of the second person and the imperative co-occur in 
response to action, yet remain independent during preparation and evaluation. In conclusion, 
Study 3 demonstrated that fragmented self-talk in the form of second-person statements and 
direct commands using the imperative were most frequent during the action phase. These 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that fragmented self-talk accompanies behavior 
regulation. 
Valence 
Self-talk valence significantly varied across the three conditions, F(2, 144) = 15.29, p < .001. 
Self-talk was more positive in the preparation (M proportion = .34, SD = 0.28) than action phase 
(M proportion = .18, SD = 0.16), t(72) = 4.67, p < .001. Self-talk was also more positive in the 
preparation than evaluation phase (M proportion = .21, SD = 0.19), t(72) = 3.85, p < .001. Action 
and evaluation phases did not significantly differ, t(72) = 1.34, p = .18. The pattern of results for 
self-talk valence is clearly different than that observed in fragmented self-talk. Therefore, 
differences across conditions in fragmented self-talk cannot be attributed to differences in 
scenario valence.4 
 
General Discussion 
 
Self-talk has fascinated scholars for decades (Hardy, 2006; Vygotsky, 1934/1987), yet few 
studies have examined the triggers and functions of self-talk (Fields, 2002; Vicente & Manrique, 
2011). In three studies, we explored whether people engage in a splitting of the mind by referring 
to themselves as You and commanding themselves as if they were commanding another person, 
in contexts that require explicit self-guidance. Study 1 demonstrated that fragmented self-talk is 
more prevalent in response to negative events than positive events. Study 2 showed that self-
fragmentation is heightened when people make autonomous rather than externally constrained 
choices. Study 3 showed that fragmented self-talk is more frequent during activity than behavior 
planning and evaluation. Finally, in each of the studies, use of You and the imperative co-
occurred in situations requiring self-control, yet remained more independent in other contexts. 
Altogether, the current research shows that fragmented self-talk arises when self-control is 
required, and therefore serves a behavior regulation function. 
Moreover, these studies indicate that people assume multiple identities when speaking with 
themselves. That is, the self can be fragmented into an I and a You, and this tendency may be 
especially prevalent in contexts requiring self-regulation. Such findings are consistent with 
recent work showing that self-talk can activate brain regions associated with both self and other-
oriented cognition (Longe et al., 2010), as well as regions associated with both speaking and 
listening (McGuire et al., 1996). Thus, the human capability for language, which allows for the 
manipulation of others, can also provide a mechanism through which people consciously control 
themselves. Although previous research has documented that the grammatical structure of self-
talk influences behavior change (Hart & Albarracín, 2009; Senay et al., 2010), our work uniquely 
demonstrates that people spontaneously use fragmented self-talk in situations that call for 
behavior change. Thus, our findings speak to the self-determined nature of self-talk, its 
situational flexibility, and motivational function. 
One limitation of the current research was that we measured projected self-talk rather than actual 
self-talk. Additional research is needed to examine whether people’s intuitions about what they 
would say to themselves in different settings approximate what they actually say to themselves. 
Another limitation was the use of third-person scenarios where participants imagined the 
behavior of another person rather than themselves. Third-person scenarios were selected to 
prevent participants from being primed with I and You while reading the scenarios. However, the 
downside to this approach is that self-talk may have been influenced by individual differences in 
perspective taking and empathy, which may not influence self-talk in everyday experience. 
To our knowledge, only one previous study examined the influence of contextual factors on self-
talk (Oliver, Markland, Hardy, & Petherick, 2008). Explicit second-person (You) references 
were not more frequent in autonomy-supportive than controlled settings. However, 
manipulations of autonomy-support not only increase autonomy but also increase perceptions of 
meaning, the sense that one’s emotions are being acknowledged, and positive affect (see Deci, 
Eghrari, Patrick, & Leone, 1994). The current research, therefore, is the first to isolate the 
independent effects of autonomy, event negativity, and action on fragmented self-talk. 
The present research raises several questions worthy of future investigation. For example, 
research could examine whether self-encouragement in the second-person form (You can do it) 
improves behavior and emotion regulation relative to self-encouragement in the first-person form 
(I can do it). Second-person statements may be more effective given that early in life, commands 
are provided externally by caregivers, and these commands become internalized and rehearsed as 
children develop (Vygotsky, 1934/1987). Future studies are also needed to examine whether 
individual differences in self-talk frequency (Brinthaupt et al., 2009) and self-consciousness 
(Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) influence the use of fragmented self-talk. Existing evidence 
shows that depressed and narcissistic people use more self-referencing words during interviews 
than their nondepressed and nonnarcissistic counterparts (Fast & Funder, 2010). Future work 
could determine whether depression and narcissism also moderate the use of fragmented self-
talk. Finally, future research is needed to examine precisely to whom people are talking when 
they address themselves in the second person. Are they speaking to internalized representations 
of parents, significant others, or some other figure? Investigating when people fragment their 
self-concept into two distinct characters, as they did in the current studies, should complement 
our understanding of the exciting dynamic of self-talk. 
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Notes 
1. Students in pilot studies read the scenarios and indicated the degree to which they required 
self-control (e.g., Stacey has control over what happens to her at the party) on 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scales. As anticipated, negative events (M = 4.98, SD = 1.40) 
were perceived as requiring more self-control than positive events (M = 3.18, SD = 1.29), t(35) = 
7.30, p < .001. Autonomous choices (M = 5.41, SD = 0.63) were perceived as requiring more 
self-control than externally constrained choices (M = 4.75, SD = 0.70), t(21) = 3.92, p = .001. 
Finally, action (M = 5.56, SD = 0.93) was perceived as requiring more self-control than 
preparation (M = 3.97, SD = 1.02), t(20) = 5.81, p < .001, and evaluation (M = 4.89, SD = 1.45), 
t(20) = 1.96, p = .06. 
2. Participants generated more words in response to negative (M = 98.7, SD = 30.9) than positive 
scenarios (M = 92.1, SD = 28.6), t(47) = 2.80, p = .007. Similarly, participants generated more 
self-statements in response to negative (M = 18.1, SD = 5.8) than positive scenarios (M = 15.6, 
SD = 5.4), t(47) = 5.14, p < .001. The influence on number of words and statements was not 
predicted but is consistent with greater attention to negative than positive events (Baumeister et 
al., 2001; Rozin & Royzmen, 2001). 
3. Participants generated slightly more words in response to external (M = 111.2, SD = 35.7) 
than internal choices (M = 103.9, SD = 37.6), t(45) = 2.16, p = .04. However, participants did not 
generate more self-statements in response to external (M = 17.7, SD = 5.7) than internal choices 
(M = 17.2, SD = 7.1), t(45) = 1.18, p = .24. These analyses were exploratory and thus received 
no further consideration. 
4. The total number of words used significantly varied across conditions, F(2, 144) = 56.94, p < 
.001. The preparation phase (M = 109.9, SD = 45.8) produced more words than the action phase 
(M = 86.8, SD = 37.0), t(72) = 9.23, p < .001, and the evaluation phase (M = 86.9, SD = 43.5), 
t(72) = 8.56, p < .001. Action and evaluation phases did not differ significantly from each other, 
t(72) = 0.42, p = .97. Additionally, the total number of statements used significantly varied 
across conditions, F(2, 144) = 56.94, p < .001. The preparation phase (M = 17.1, SD = 7.3) 
produced more statements than the action phase (M = 16.1, SD = 7.4), t(72) = 3.16, p = .002, and 
the evaluation phase (M = 15.0, SD = 7.5), t(72) = 5.52, p < .001. The action phase produced 
more statements than the evaluation phase, t(72) = 3.24, p = .002. 
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